BEAUTY AND THE LABOR MARKET: EVIDENCE FROM RESTAURANT SERVERS

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Abstract:

This paper examines labor market discrimination based on beauty using survey data collected by the author on restaurant servers. Two things make this study unique and different from previous studies. First, I am able to measure (in a real-world setting), and thus control for, employee productivity, thus allowing me to better isolate the effect of beauty on earnings. Second, my examination of the beauty wage gap focuses not just on the employee, but also the employer. I find that the beauty wage gap is a phenomenon that affects female employees, and is driven by pure-discriminating female employers.

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1. Introduction

Beauty plays a nontrivial role in people's lives. For example, in 2004 in the United States, 9.2 million cosmetic surgery procedures were performed, representing a 5 percent increase over the previous year (*Advertising Age* 2006), and an approximate 118 percent increase since 1997 (Gerstung 2005). The majority (roughly 87%) of these procedures, which range from Botox injections to buttock lifts to tummy tucks, were performed on women (*Advertising Age* 2006). However, demand by males for cosmetic procedures shows signs of increasing, too. For example, Botox for men grew an impressive 40% in the United States between 2001 and 2002 (*Soap Perfumery and Cosmetics* 2002).

While it can be argued that cosmetic procedures probably do help to provide some improvement to one's appearance, undergoing such a procedure carries with it substantial risk. Not only can such procedures be deadly or botched, but those who undergo these procedures can become addicted – in 2004, for instance, 40% of cosmetic plastic surgery patients were repeat customers (Gerstung 2005). Such risks, without doubt, help to explain the 22% increase in 2003 in nonsurgical procedures such as facial peels, dermabrasion kits, and wrinkle-repair treatments (*Chain Drug Review* 2004).

All of this attention paid to beauty and appearance is not just a sign of the times. Medieval noblewomen, for instance, swallowed arsenic and applied bats' blood in order to improve their complexions (*The Economist* 2003). Victorian ladies, in order to attain a wasp-like waist, would have their lower ribs removed (*The Economist* 2003).

The above discussion begs the question of why all of this attention paid to beauty and appearance, especially given the potential dangerous consequences of attaining such beauty. One potential explanation is that beauty and appearance attract a premium in the labor market.

This paper examines labor market discrimination based on beauty using survey data collected by the author on restaurant servers. More specifically, I treat each restaurant customer as an employer who pays a wage to his or her server, who is in turn treated as the employee in the relationship, in the form of a tip, so that each tip transaction associated with a particular server and a particular customer is essentially a unique wage offer that is potentially different from a tip transaction between that server and another of the server's customers. What results is a data set of wage offers, which I use to examine whether attractive servers earn higher tips from customers than unattractive servers. Note that throughout the paper, I use "employer" and "customer" interchangeably, and "employee" and "server" interchangeably.

What makes this paper unique and different from previous studies is that here, instead of relying on some vector of productivity proxies, I am able to measure employee productivity. The importance of this is emphasized in Hamermesh and Biddle (1994), who rely on several national data sets in their seminal examination of the beauty wage gap[1], and state that "It is very difficult to construct a research design that allows one to distinguish labor market outcomes arising from discrimination against a group from those produced by intergroup differences in unobserved (by the researcher) productivity." Some papers, most notably Biddle and Hamermesh (1998), with the hope of minimizing productivity differences across workers, have examined workers within a specific occupation.[2] However, again, in this paper I have constructed a research design that allows me to actually measure employee productivity.[3]

[1] Other studies that have examined the beauty wage gap using national data sets include: Quinn (1978); Roszell, Kennedy, and Grabb (1989); Harper (2000); and, Hamermesh, Meng, and Zhang (2002).

[2] See also Ross and Ferris (1981); Frieze, Olson, and Russell (1991); Hornik (1992); Lynn and Simons (2000); Pfann, Biddle, Hamermesh, and Bosman (2000); and, French (2002). Note that both Hornik (1992) and Lynn and Simons (2000) examine restaurant servers, but they do so without any systematic thought about the role of beauty in the labor market. Furthermore, Hornik (1992) fails to control for server productivity, and Lynn and Simons (2000) control for server productivity based on server self-ratings of general service ability. As well, the analysis in Lynn and Simons (2000) consists of a limited number of observations (< 50). This is due to the fact that only a single tip amount, which represents a multi-week average of the server's tips, is associated with each server in the study. Finally, both Hornik (1992) and Lynn and Simons (2000) incorporate in their analyses a very limited number of control variables, and neither examines the customer's role as I do here.

This paper is also the first, to my knowledge, to offer additional insight into the beauty wage gap by examining not just the employee, but also the employer. My findings suggest that the beauty wage gap is a phenomenon driven by female employers and affecting female employees. An immediate implication of this result is that the channels (increased confidence, employer perception of greater ability, and better oral skills) identified by Mobius and Rosenblat (2006), through which more attractive workers earn higher wages, appear not to apply outside of the laboratory. If such channels did apply, then the beauty wage gap should be independent of employer sex, which it is not. Therefore, credence is lent to pure discrimination as the driver of beauty-based discrimination by female employers against female employees.

The layout of this paper is as follows. In Section 2, I argue the advantages of a data set consisting of restaurant servers in examining the beauty wage gap.[4] Section 3 discusses the procedures I employed in collecting survey data, while Section 4 describes the data and method of analysis used in this paper. Section 5 presents the results of my analysis, with Section 6 concluding.

2. The Advantages of a Tipping Data Set

Again, each restaurant customer is treated as an employer who pays a wage to his or her server, who in turn is treated as the employee in the relationship, in the form of a tip, so that each tip transaction associated with a particular customer and a particular server is essentially a unique wage offer that is potentially different from a tip transaction between that server and another of the server's customers. Put alternatively, even though my data set consists of a limited number

[3] It should be noted that Mobius and Rosenblat (2006) present an experimental examination of the beauty wage gap in a labor market setting where, as part of their experimental design, productivity is uncorrelated with physical attractiveness. However, while the incentive structure in experiments ensures that responses are genuine, the lab environment lacks external validity and may not accurately capture aspects of behavior that occur in field settings. Alternatively, my work, while more realistic, suffers from the fact that some survey respondents might provide insincere responses. Thus, my work and the work by Mobius and Rosenblat are essentially complementary.

[4] Actually, such a data set is advantageous in examining any type of discrimination, not just beauty-based discrimination.

of servers, each tip transaction between a particular server and a particular customer constitutes a unique wage offer, so that the richness of the data set far exceeds the total number of servers of which it is comprised. Again, throughout the paper "employer" and "customer" are used interchangeably, and "employee" and "server" are used interchangeably.

There are several advantages of using a data set consisting of restaurant servers to examine the beauty wage gap. First, economic theory says that wages are based on productivity, and the most obvious measure of a server's productivity is the quality of service that the server provides to his or her customers. Instead of relying on a vector of productivity proxies, like in Hamermesh and Biddle (2004) and Biddle and Hamermesh (1998), I measure server productivity by asking survey respondents to rate the service quality that they received from their server on a seven-point scale. By actually controlling for server productivity, a primary determinant of earnings, instead of relying on proxies for it, I am able to better isolate the effect of beauty on earnings. Of course, it is possible that customers who discriminate based on attractiveness might rate less attractive servers as providing inferior service quality, and more attractive servers as providing superior service quality. Another data issue related to server productivity that could arise is that some customers might be poor tippers, regardless of the service they receive, and will try to justify their poor tip by rating service quality as poor (this latter issue is likely to be moot, given that the survey respondents completed the survey both anonymously and in private). Either of these issues might underestimate the effect of attractiveness on tip earnings so that, if I find evidence of a beauty wage gap, the effect might really be larger than that which is reported.

Secondly, I am able to rule out the issue of causality between earnings and beauty. Most previous studies do not measure beauty and earnings contemporaneously. For example, the data sets used in Hamermesh and Biddle (1994) were constructed by having the interviewer, who visited the respondent in his or her home, rate the respondent's physical appearance on a five-

point scale, in addition to collecting data on other labor market and demographic variables. In cases such as this, where beauty and earnings are not measured contemporaneously, while beauty might cause earnings, it might also be the case that earnings cause beauty. In my data set, since beauty is being measured contemporaneously with the tip, it is impossible for earnings (the tip) to cause beauty.

Third, a tipping data set provides a server's earnings over a very short period of time, because the server's time span of employment lasts only as long as the customer dines. It is extremely difficult to compare workers' wages over the span of, say, even a year. For example, two otherwise identical laborers working in the same job might earn a different wage or salary in a given year if one of them had to use extra sick days beyond what he was originally allocated. The inability to observe such information weakens the ability to control for differences in wages across employees. Again, this issue is moot with a tipping data set.

Fourth, I control not only for various server characteristics, but for several characteristics of the customer as well. The former allows me to better isolate the effect of beauty on earnings while the latter, as discussed in the previous section, allows me to offer additional insight into the beauty wage gap by examining not just the employee but also the employer.

Finally, what makes Hamermesh and Biddle (1994) a seminal paper is that they were the first to offer a nontrivial explanation of their beauty wage gap result. Two of their hypotheses had to do with customer versus employer ("pure") discrimination. Employer discrimination refers to the idea that employers might have a taste for more attractive workers, as opposed to less attractive workers. On the other hand, customer discrimination refers to the idea that customers might prefer to deal with more attractive workers, so that more attractive workers are actually more productive than their less attractive counterparts. Thus, the employer will pay the latter less, based on differences in productivity. Since the customer is the employer in a tipping

environment, and since I am able to control for employee productivity, if I find evidence of a beauty wage gap, then it can be concluded that pure discrimination is the culprit, right? Not necessarily. Again, as discussed previously, Mobius and Rosenblat (2006) identified three channels through which more attractive workers earn higher wages: increased confidence, employer perception of greater ability, and better oral skills. Therefore, a beauty wage gap result might be due to these factors, which are unobserved but related to beauty, instead of pure discrimination. However, as was discussed briefly in Section 1, and as will be illustrated in Section 5, it is female employers, not male employers, who drive the beauty wage gap result. If the channels identified by Mobius and Rosenblat (2006) did apply outside of the laboratory, then the beauty wage gap should be independent of employer sex, which it is not. Therefore, credence is lent to pure discrimination as the driver of beauty-based discrimination by female employers against female employees.

3. Survey Procedure

I collected survey data from five Richmond, Virginia restaurants during May/June 2003. At each restaurant, the data were collected on each of a Thursday, Friday, and Saturday evening, from 6 p.m. until roughly 10 p.m. Customers were approached as they exited the restaurant and the same two people, both myself and an assistant, administered the surveys at all five of the restaurants. In the interest of obtaining more reliable responses, but at the cost of obtaining fewer completed surveys, survey respondents completed the survey privately (via clipboard, with pen attached) and were asked to fold and place their completed survey in a box. A total of 501 surveys were collected out of 630 attempts, yielding a response rate of 79.5%. A copy of the survey is provided in Appendix A.

Consistent with Biddle and Hamermesh (1998), question 11 on the survey asks respondents to rate their server's attractiveness on a five-point scale as either homely (1), below average (2),

average (3), above average (4), or strikingly handsome/beautiful (5). Three groups are then created, representing attractive (4, 5), average-looking (3), and below average-looking (1, 2) servers. The distribution of these attractiveness ratings across servers, which is provided in Table 1, reveals a small fraction of servers falling in the below average-looking category. This lies in contrast to Hamermesh and Biddle (1994) who report double-digit percentages of American men and women who are below average-looking, as I define below average-looking. I address this small percentage of below average-looking servers in my sample, which is likely due to self-selection, by combining the average-looking and below average-looking groups defined above into a single group, so that what I end up with are two groups of servers (with respect to beauty) – an attractive (4, 5) group and an unattractive (1, 2, 3) group.

Server productivity is measured using question 9 on the survey, which asks respondents to rate the service quality that they received from their server on a seven-point scale. The second parts of questions 4 and 5 are used as filters. They ask, respectively, whether or not the respondent received help either paying the bill or leaving a tip. I do not want to include in my data set customers who paid for the bill, but were assisted by others in paying either the tip or the bill. Question 6, which asks whether the tip was automatically added to the bill, was also used as a filter. In any of these cases, the customer's tip that is recorded on the survey may or may not accurately reflect that customer's tipping behavior.

As stated previously, I also incorporate a large number of customer and server characteristics that might affect a server's tip into my analysis. Using most of the remaining questions on the survey, I create several explanatory variables that account for such characteristics.

Finally, it should be noted that I am unable to identify specific servers in the data set as, say, "server x". Survey respondents did not identify their server beyond the characteristics asked for on the survey. For example, if the distribution of servers by sex reveals that 200 of the survey

respondents reported having a female server, this does not imply that the sample consists of 200 unique female servers. In order to provide some insight into how many male and female servers comprise the data set, refer to Table 2, which provides a breakdown of the number of male and female servers working at each restaurant, during each night the survey was administered.

4. Data and Econometric Specification

I began my analysis with a total of 501 observations. However, after cleaning the data, I was left with 307 observations. The dollar value of the tip is used as the dependent variable in my analysis and the data were estimated using OLS. However, because of heteroskedasticity concerns, I report, and conduct all associated statistical inference using, White-corrected standard errors. A description of the variables used in my analysis, as well as summary statistics, is provided in Table 3.

4.1 Data Cleaning

Regarding the data cleaning exercise, no analysis of the data occurred until after the data were cleaned. Regarding the actual cleaning process, all observations for which a "yes" response was recorded for the second part of either question 4 or 5, or for question 6, were deleted. The data were further cleaned by deleting those observations for which respondents either did not provide a response, or for which respondents provided an ambiguous response, to the most critical questions on the survey (these questions are 1-2, 4-7, and 9-24).[5] This was the extent of the data cleaning exercise. Surveys for which a respondent did not respond to certain questions, or provided ambiguous responses to certain questions, cannot be reliably used in the analysis. Also, as previously discussed, I am unable to rely on survey data for which the respondent received help with either the bill or the tip, or for which the respondent's tip reflects an automatic service charge. As a sanity check, I compared the mean percentage tip of the 307 observations

[5] Note that the second part of question 7 was not considered critical.

used in my analysis (23.22%) to the mean percentage tip of the 194 observations I had to drop from the analysis (23.63%).[6] A t-test reveals that the difference between these two means is not statistically significant (p = .895, two-tailed).

The reason why so many observations were dropped during the cleaning process is due to the fact that, again, customers completed the survey privately, as opposed to either me or my colleague asking them the survey questions face-to-face. Having the customers complete the survey privately allowed for greater anonymity and, thus, a higher probability of obtaining truthful responses. So, while I might have fewer observations to work with, such observations are arguably more reliable than if I had instead asked the respondents the survey questions face-to-face.

4.2 Comparison of Data to U.S. Population and Broad Server Data Set

The data set might at first appear to be limited, given the fact that it reflects only five restaurants, all of which are located in a single U.S. city. However, as Table 4 suggests, these five restaurants represent a variety of food offerings, at a variety of prices.

In addition, as illustrated in Table 5, I compared certain demographic characteristics (e.g., age, education, income, sex, marital status, race, and religious service attendance) of the survey respondents in my data set with those of the U.S. population as a whole, and found the former to be broadly comparable to the latter. For example, the median age of the respondents in my data set is 46, compared with 36 in the U.S. population as a whole. Median family income of the respondents in my data set exceeds $82,000/year, whereas in the U.S. population as a whole, median family income is $55,832. Also, the percentage of respondents in my data set with a bachelor's degree is 73%, compared to only 27% in the U.S. population as a whole. However,

[6] The 307 observations used in the analysis here could not be compared to the entire 194 observations dropped from the analysis. This is because for 23 of the 194 observations, data used to calculate percentage tip (e.g. the dollar amount of the tip and the bill size) were either not available or were ambiguous.

according to a National Restaurant Association report based on data collected by the NPD Group, income is an important driver of commercially prepared meal consumption (Ebbin 2000). Therefore, it is not surprising that income and education level, strong correlates, are both higher for respondents in my data set than in the U.S. population as a whole. The percentage of white persons is also higher for respondents in my data set (94%) versus the U.S. population as a whole (75%), which is likely due to income differences between white and non-white persons.[7] The National Restaurant Association report also reveals that men are more likely than women to consume commercially prepared meals, which lends credence to the large percentage of male respondents in my data set relative to the U.S. population as a whole. Also lending credence to this is casual empiricism, which suggests that it is the male who tends to pay the bill when dining out with his spouse. Finally, while the percentage of respondents in my data set who regularly attend religious services (50%) compares to the U.S. population as a whole (41%), my data do consist of a larger percentage of married respondents (75% compared to 53% in the U.S. population as a whole). Regarding the latter, I point again to casual empiricism, which suggests that sit-down restaurants tend to attract a large number of married couples.

Regarding the servers that comprise my data, certain demographic characteristics (e.g., sex and race) of the servers in my data set were found to be very similar to the 1,588 servers appearing in an anonymous online survey of U.S. restaurant servers, the results of which are reported in Lynn (2006). My data set consists of a 30%-70% split between dining experiences involving male and female servers, respectively. The exact same split between male and female servers is reported in Lynn (2006). Regarding server race, 94% of the dining experiences in my

[7] In the U.S. population in 2004, Asian households had the highest median income ($57,518), while the median income for non-Hispanic white households, Hispanic households, and black households, respectively, was $48,977, $34,241, and $30,134 (U.S. Census Bureau 2006).

data set involve a white server. This is very similar to the 88% of white servers reported in Lynn (2006).

Finally, it should be noted that the reason why I collected data from these five restaurants, as opposed to other restaurants, is because these restaurants were the ones willing to let me survey their customers. Collecting field data is tough – I asked approximately twenty-five restaurants for permission to survey their customers, with only six obliging.[8]

5. Results

5.1 General Results

The results from Regression 1, illustrated in Table 6, establish that a beauty wage gap exists. Attractive servers earn roughly 88 cents more than unattractive servers ($p = .007$, two-tailed). However, this wage gap might be due to factors other than beauty. For example, it could be that unattractive servers are less productive than their attractive counterparts. To control for this, and other, possibilities, so as to best isolate the effect of beauty on earnings, Regression 2 incorporates several explanatory variables to control for both server productivity (e.g., service quality), as well as various server and customer demographics.

For robustness purposes, Regression 2, and all subsequent Regressions, is comprised of three regression analyses. With respect to Regression 2, and similarly for all subsequent Regressions, I label the three analyses, respectively, Regression #2a, Regression #2b, and Regression #2c. All results will be reported with respect to Regression #2a, which is the full model minus both restaurant dummies (e.g., R1 – R5) and the variable "weekday". Regression #2b adds restaurant dummies, but not the variable "weekday", to the Regression #2a analysis, while Regression #2c adds "weekday" to the Regression #2b analysis. Again, the latter two analyses are used as a robustness check of the former.

Regression #2a, reported in Table 6, shows that even after including additional explanatory variables, attractive servers earn 63 cents more in tips than unattractive servers ($p = .023$, two-tailed). Interestingly, the coefficient on attractiveserver, relative to Regression #1, fell from .88 to .63, indicating that the inclusion of additional explanatory variables helps to explain at least part of the beauty wage gap. However, the fact that a beauty wage gap still exists, even after controlling for other factors, is evidence of labor market discrimination based on beauty. The robustness of this result is illustrated in Regressions #2b and #2c, which are also reported in Table 6.

5.2 Results by Server Sex

Here, I examine the beauty wage gap by server sex. Four dummy variables are created to correspond to an attractive male (female) server and an unattractive male (female) server. To examine the beauty wage gap by server sex, I compare the tip earnings of attractive and unattractive male servers, and attractive and unattractive female servers.

Regression #3a, illustrated in Table 7, reveals that attractive females earn roughly 77 cents more in tips than unattractive females ($p = .019$, two-tailed). There is no significant difference, however, between the tip earnings of attractive and unattractive males ($p = .637$, two-tailed). It appears, then, that the beauty wage gap is a phenomenon that affects female servers. The robustness of these results is demonstrated in Regressions #3b and #3c, which are also reported in Table 7.

5.3 Results by Server and Customer Sex

Here, I stratify my data set by customer sex, resulting in 204 observations reflecting only male customers, and 103 observations reflecting only female customers. Within each of these sub-samples, I examine the beauty wage gap by server sex. More specifically, within each of

[8] One of the six was really a bar. Collecting survey data from the inebriated is not only tough, but their responses

these sub-samples, and relying on the dummy variables discussed in Section 5.2, I compare the tip earnings of attractive and unattractive male servers, and attractive and unattractive female servers.

Regression #4a, which considers the male customer sub-sample and is illustrated in Table 8, reveals no significant difference between the tip earnings of either attractive and unattractive males (p = .579, two-tailed), or attractive and unattractive females (p = .122, two-tailed). The robustness of this result is demonstrated in Regressions #4b and #4c, which are also reported in Table 8.

Regression 5 considers the female customer sub-sample, and is illustrated in Table 9. What Regression #5a reveals is that while there is no significant difference between the tip earnings of attractive and unattractive males (p = .979, two-tailed), attractive females earn approximately 93 cents more in tip earnings than unattractive females (p = .087, two-tailed). This result is robust to the inclusion of both restaurant dummies (see Table 9, Regression #5b), as well as the "weekday" variable (see Table 9, Regression #5c).[9] Combined with the results in Section 5.2, this result reveals that the beauty wage gap is a phenomenon driven by female employers (customers) and affecting female employees (servers).

6. Discussion

As discussed in Section 2, the research design employed here to examine the beauty wage gap offers several advantages. The most significant of these is that, instead of relying on some vector of productivity proxies, I am able to measure employee (server) productivity. This step is essential in being able to optimally isolate the effect of beauty on earnings.

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are suspect; therefore, we decided against collecting survey data at this establishment.

[9] The decline in the coefficient on unattractivefemale in Regression #5c suggests the existence of a minimal amount of correlation between each of unattractivefemale and attractivefemale (suppressed) and weekday. A calculation of the correlation coefficient between attractivefemale and weekday (.149) and unattractivefemale and weekday (-.170) confirms this. The result of this correlation is that some of the effect of female attractiveness on tip earnings is getting captured in the weekday variable, causing the effect of the unattractivefemale variable to spuriously weaken.

Furthermore, this paper is the first (to my knowledge) to offer additional insight into the beauty wage gap by examining not just the employee, but also the employer. My findings suggest that the beauty wage gap is a phenomenon driven by female employers (customers) and affecting female employees (servers). An implication of this result is that the channels identified by Mobius and Rosenblat (2006), through which more attractive workers earn higher wages, appear not to apply outside of the laboratory. If such channels did apply, then the beauty wage gap should be independent of employer sex, which it is not. Therefore, credence is lent to pure discrimination as the culprit.

Regarding why the beauty wage gap appears to be a phenomenon associated solely with female employers, I can only speculate. For example, casual empiricism suggests that females are more beauty-conscious than males, which might translate into the former being more perceiving, and thus rewarding, with respect to beauty. However, why only female employees seem to be affected, and not male employees, is puzzling. I leave this open for future research.

Table 1 – Distribution of Attractiveness Ratings Across Servers

Attractiveness	Frequency	Percentage
Below Average-Looking	6	1.95%
Average-Looking	170	55.37%
Attractive	131	42.67%

Table 2 – Number of Male and Female Servers

Restaurant	Evening	Male Servers	Female Servers
R1	Thursday	0	3
R1	Friday	0	4
R1	Saturday	0	4
R2	Thursday	4	5
R2	Friday	1	6
R2	Saturday	2	6
R3	Thursday	2	3
R3	Friday	5	2
R3	Saturday	3	4
R4	Thursday	3	2
R4	Friday	4	2
R4	Saturday	4	3
R5	Thursday	1	5
R5	Friday	1	6
R5	Saturday	3	3

Table 3 – Description of Variables and Summary Statistics (N = 307)

Variable	Description	Mean	SD
% tip	$ tip as percentage of billsize	23.22	30.88
$ tip	$ amount of tip	6.52	4.28
billsize	total bill amount	34.67	21.99
attractiveserver	dummy equal to 1 for server with beauty equal to 4 or 5 on question 11 of survey; 0 otherwise	0.43	0.50
% tipnorm	customer's belief regarding percentage tip norm	16.86	2.97
$ tipnorm	(% tipnorm) x (billsize)	5.84	4.03
tablesize	number of people at customer's table	2.79	1.38
#checks	number of checks at customer's table	1.13	0.60
age	age of customer	44.69	12.15
maleserver	dummy equal to 1 if server male; 0 otherwise	0.30	0.46
servicequality	customer's rating of service quality on scale from 1 ("Poor") to 7 ("Excellent")	5.70	1.12
whiteserver	dummy equal to 1 if server white; 0 otherwise	0.94	0.24
overweightserver	dummy equal to 1 for server with weight equal to 4 or 5 on question 12 of survey; 0 otherwise	0.08	0.27
R1	dummy equal to 1 if restaurant surveyed was Restaurant 1; 0 otherwise	0.26	0.44
R2	dummy equal to 1 if restaurant surveyed was Restaurant 2; 0 otherwise	0.21	0.41
R3	dummy equal to 1 if restaurant surveyed was Restaurant 3; 0 otherwise	0.18	0.39
R4	dummy equal to 1 if restaurant surveyed was Restaurant 4; 0 otherwise	0.18	0.38
R5	dummy equal to 1 if restaurant surveyed was Restaurant 5; 0 otherwise	0.17	0.38
religious	dummy equal to 1 if customer regularly attends religious services; 0 otherwise	0.50	0.50
credit/atm card	dummy equal to 1 if customer paid with credit card or atm card; 0 otherwise	0.69	0.46
diningfrequency	customer's rating of frequency with which he/she dines at the restaurant, on a scale from 1 ("Least Frequent") to 7 ("Most Frequent")	3.28	1.75

Table 3 (cont'd) – Description of Variables and Summary Statistics (N = 307)

Variable	Description	Mean	SD
serverbackground	dummy equal to 1 if customer's close friends/family and/or customer ever a server; 0 otherwise	0.73	0.44
dependent-on-parents	dummy equal to 1 if customer is dependent on parents for tax purposes; 0 otherwise	0.03	0.16
male	dummy equal to 1 if customer male; 0 otherwise	0.66	0.47
married	dummy equal to 1 if customer married; 0 otherwise	0.75	0.44
income	variable equal to 1 if customer income on question 21 of survey is "Less Than $18,000", . . . , equal to 5 if customer income on question 21 of survey is "More Than $82,000"	4.35	0.95
highschooldegree	dummy equal to 1 if customer highest education level completion of high school or some college; 0 otherwise	0.27	0.45
bachelorsdegree	dummy equal to 1 if customer highest education level is bachelor's degree; 0 otherwise	0.40	0.49
graduatedegree	dummy equal to 1 if customer highest education level is graduate/professional degree; 0 otherwise	0.32	0.47
white	dummy equal to 1 if customer white; 0 otherwise	0.94	0.24
attractivecustomer	dummy equal to 1 for customer with beauty equal to 4 or 5 on question 23 of survey; 0 otherwise	0.34	0.48
attractivemale	dummy equal to 1 if maleserver = 1 and attractiveserver = 1; 0 otherwise	0.09	0.28
unattractivemale	dummy equal to 1 if maleserver = 1 and attractiveserver = 0; 0 otherwise	0.21	0.41
attractivefemale	dummy equal to 1 if maleserver = 0 and attractiveserver = 1; 0 otherwise	0.34	0.47
unattractivefemale	dummy equal to 1 if maleserver = 0 and attractiveserver = 0; 0 otherwise	0.36	0.48
weekday	dummy equal to 1 if survey day was Thursday evening, 0 otherwise	0.25	0.43

Table 4 – Description of Restaurants Surveyed

Restaurant	Appetizers	Salads As Meal	Sandwiches	Entrees	Type of Rest.
R1	$2.35-$4.95	$6.75-$7.95	$4.25-$7.35	$8.15-$17.95	Italian/Amer.
R2	$3.25-$5.45	$6.25-$7.25	$5.95-$7.25	$6.75-$14.95	BBQ
R3	$2.99-$7.99	$6.99-$8.49	$5.99-$6.49	$8.99-$15.99	BBQ
R4	$4.95-$9.95	$6.25-$7.25	NA	$7.95-$16.95	Greek/Italian
R5	$3.50-$10.90	$8.50-$9.95	$6.95-$11.95	$13.95-$24.95	Amer./Seafood

Table 5 – Demographic Comparison of Survey Respondents and U.S. Population

	Restaurant Server Data Set	U.S. Population as Whole
Median age	46	36*
% with bachelor's degree	73%	27%[10],*
Median family income	> $82,000	$55,832*
% male	66%	49%*
% married	75%	53%[11],*
% white	94%	75%*
% regularly attending religious services	50%	41%[12],**

Source: U.S. Census Bureau 2005 American Community Survey*
Source: http://www.religioustolerance.org (accessed October 7, 2006)**

[10] This figure represents the percentage of the population 25 years and over who hold a bachelor's degree.
[11] This figure represents the percentage of the age 15+ population who are married.
[12] Note that the U.S. does not include a question about religion in its census, and has not done so for over fifty years, hence the need to turn to religioustolerance.org. I rely on the website's Gallup Organization estimate for 2001, the latest year which is provided.

Table 6 – Results from Regressions #1 and #2a - #2c

	Regression #1 Dep Var = $ tip			Regression #2a Dep Var = $ tip			Regression #2b Dep Var = $ tip			Regression #2c Dep Var = $ tip		
	Coefficient	SE	P-Value (2-tail)	Coefficient	SE	P-Value (2-tail)	Coefficient	SE	P-Value (2-tail)	Coefficient	SE	P-Value (2-tail)
constant	0.84	0.59	0.151	-1.91	1.40	0.173	-2.18	1.71	0.204	-2.17	1.70	0.202
billsize	0.15	0.02	<.001	0.09	0.03	<.001	0.10	0.03	<.001	0.10	0.03	<.001
attractiveserver	0.88	0.33	0.007	0.63	0.28	0.023	0.70	0.31	0.024	0.70	0.31	0.025
$ tipnorm	-	-	-	0.38	0.18	0.033	0.38	0.18	0.035	0.38	0.18	0.038
tablesize	-	-	-	-0.09	0.19	0.631	-0.09	0.21	0.651	-0.09	0.21	0.652
#checks	-	-	-	0.95	0.76	0.212	1.00	0.80	0.211	1.00	0.80	0.212
age	-	-	-	-0.01	0.01	0.295	-0.02	0.01	0.244	-0.02	0.01	0.242
maleserver	-	-	-	-0.11	0.23	0.646	0.09	0.30	0.777	0.09	0.31	0.769
servicequality	-	-	-	0.45	0.12	<.001	0.43	0.12	<.001	0.43	0.12	<.001
whiteserver	-	-	-	0.31	0.33	0.358	0.12	0.38	0.756	0.11	0.40	0.782
overweightserver	-	-	-	0.58	0.37	0.123	0.66	0.39	0.093	0.66	0.39	0.093
religious	-	-	-	0.20	0.30	0.492	0.21	0.29	0.467	0.21	0.29	0.475
credit/atm card	-	-	-	-0.10	0.37	0.792	-0.11	0.38	0.771	-0.10	0.38	0.784
diningfrequency	-	-	-	0.10	0.07	0.130	0.10	0.08	0.193	0.10	0.08	0.192
serverbackground	-	-	-	0.12	0.29	0.688	0.16	0.29	0.577	0.15	0.30	0.608
dependent-on-parents	-	-	-	0.22	0.85	0.799	0.19	0.81	0.810	0.20	0.80	0.798
male	-	-	-	0.46	0.26	0.077	0.50	0.26	0.058	0.50	0.26	0.053
married	-	-	-	-0.59	0.56	0.290	-0.59	0.57	0.308	-0.58	0.59	0.322
income	-	-	-	-0.07	0.28	0.795	-0.05	0.28	0.859	-0.05	0.29	0.856
bachelorsdegree	-	-	-	-0.54	0.39	0.161	-0.55	0.37	0.132	-0.55	0.38	0.145
graduatedegree	-	-	-	-0.21	0.45	0.643	-0.16	0.47	0.742	-0.15	0.48	0.746
white	-	-	-	-0.06	0.65	0.931	-0.08	0.69	0.902	-0.08	0.69	0.903
attractivecustomer	-	-	-	-0.15	0.30	0.616	-0.18	0.32	0.564	-0.19	0.32	0.560
R1	-	-	-	-	-	-	0.59	0.43	0.171	0.59	0.43	0.171
R2	-	-	-	-	-	-	0.61	0.71	0.391	0.61	0.72	0.394
R3	-	-	-	-	-	-	0.21	0.53	0.691	0.21	0.52	0.691
R4	-	-	-	-	-	-	0.01	0.41	0.978	0.01	0.41	0.985
weekday	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0.06	0.39	0.870
R^2	0.63	-	-	0.69	-	-	0.69	-	-	0.69	-	-
F-Statistic	44.61	-	<.001	14.19	-	<.001	14.78	-	<.001	14.29	-	<.001
N	307	-	-	307	-	-	307	-	-	307	-	-

Table 7 – Results from Regressions #3a - #3c

	Regression #3a Dep Var = $ tip			Regression #3b Dep Var = $ tip			Regression #3c Dep Var = $ tip		
	Coefficient	SE	P-Value (2-tail)	Coefficient	SE	P-Value (2-tail)	Coefficient	SE	P-Value (2-tail)
constant	-1.16	1.35	0.389	-1.38	1.60	0.389	-1.38	1.60	0.388
billsize	0.09	0.03	<.001	0.10	0.03	<.001	0.10	0.03	<.001
attractivemale	-0.46	0.46	0.312	-0.30	0.54	0.578	-0.30	0.54	0.585
unattractivemale	-0.69	0.35	0.048	-0.57	0.39	0.147	-0.56	0.39	0.155
unattractivefemale	-0.77	0.33	0.019	-0.85	0.36	0.018	-0.85	0.36	0.018
$ tipnorm	0.37	0.18	0.036	0.38	0.18	0.037	0.38	0.18	0.038
tablesize	-0.10	0.19	0.601	-0.10	0.21	0.633	-0.10	0.21	0.635
#checks	0.95	0.76	0.210	1.01	0.80	0.209	1.01	0.80	0.210
age	-0.01	0.01	0.287	-0.02	0.01	0.234	-0.02	0.01	0.233
servicequality	0.45	0.13	<.001	0.43	0.12	<.001	0.43	0.12	<.001
whiteserver	0.31	0.33	0.343	0.13	0.38	0.727	0.13	0.39	0.745
overweightserver	0.58	0.37	0.118	0.66	0.39	0.090	0.66	0.39	0.090
religious	0.20	0.30	0.511	0.20	0.29	0.487	0.20	0.29	0.492
credit/atm card	-0.10	0.37	0.778	-0.11	0.37	0.765	-0.11	0.38	0.771
diningfrequency	0.10	0.07	0.143	0.09	0.08	0.209	0.10	0.08	0.210
serverbackground	0.10	0.29	0.742	0.14	0.29	0.621	0.14	0.30	0.641
dependent-on-parents	0.17	0.87	0.850	0.14	0.83	0.867	0.14	0.81	0.860
male	0.46	0.26	0.083	0.49	0.26	0.065	0.49	0.26	0.060
married	-0.54	0.57	0.341	-0.53	0.58	0.363	-0.53	0.59	0.371
income	-0.07	0.28	0.791	-0.05	0.28	0.855	-0.05	0.29	0.856
bachelorsdegree	-0.53	0.39	0.176	-0.54	0.37	0.144	-0.54	0.38	0.155
graduatedegree	-0.19	0.45	0.683	-0.14	0.48	0.772	-0.14	0.48	0.774
white	-0.12	0.66	0.860	-0.15	0.70	0.829	-0.15	0.70	0.831
attractivecustomer	-0.12	0.30	0.686	-0.15	0.32	0.633	-0.16	0.32	0.629
R1	-	-	-	0.62	0.44	0.153	0.62	0.43	0.151
R2	-	-	-	0.64	0.71	0.371	0.64	0.72	0.376
R3	-	-	-	0.22	0.53	0.677	0.22	0.52	0.677
R4	-	-	-	0.07	0.44	0.874	0.07	0.44	0.877
weekday	-	-	-	-	-	-	0.03	0.39	0.944
R^2	0.69	-	-	0.69	-	-	0.69	-	-
F-Statistic	13.80	-	<.001	14.63	-	<.001	14.15	-	<.001
N	307	-	-	307	-	-	307	-	-

Table 8 – Results from Regressions #4a - #4c

	Regression #4a Dep Var = $ tip			Regression #4b Dep Var = $ tip			Regression #4c Dep Var = $ tip		
	Coefficient	SE	P-Value (2-tail)	Coefficient	SE	P-Value (2-tail)	Coefficient	SE	P-Value (2-tail)
constant	-0.39	1.79	0.827	-0.34	2.20	0.876	-0.62	2.25	0.783
billsize	0.05	0.04	0.177	0.05	0.04	0.149	0.04	0.04	0.252
attractivemale	-0.45	0.65	0.487	-0.41	0.73	0.580	-0.54	0.75	0.473
unattractivemale	-0.84	0.49	0.086	-0.75	0.59	0.209	-0.81	0.61	0.185
unattractivefemale	-0.61	0.39	0.122	-0.66	0.44	0.139	-0.67	0.44	0.131
$ tipnorm	0.58	0.23	0.014	0.57	0.23	0.014	0.61	0.24	0.012
tablesize	0.08	0.24	0.735	0.11	0.26	0.689	0.10	0.26	0.702
#checks	0.81	0.75	0.286	0.76	0.80	0.347	0.71	0.79	0.375
age	-0.01	0.02	0.618	-0.01	0.02	0.607	-0.01	0.02	0.595
servicequality	0.42	0.17	0.014	0.41	0.17	0.017	0.45	0.18	0.013
whiteserver	-0.18	0.42	0.675	-0.21	0.43	0.625	-0.07	0.44	0.869
overweightserver	0.41	0.44	0.356	0.44	0.46	0.343	0.43	0.45	0.334
religious	0.17	0.37	0.654	0.17	0.36	0.640	0.19	0.37	0.605
credit/atm card	0.11	0.51	0.829	0.12	0.51	0.819	0.11	0.51	0.826
diningfrequency	0.06	0.09	0.502	0.06	0.09	0.553	0.05	0.09	0.585
serverbackground	0.04	0.31	0.900	0.07	0.31	0.826	0.13	0.33	0.681
dependent-on-parents	1.44	1.18	0.224	1.40	1.21	0.251	1.20	1.23	0.329
married	-1.65	0.95	0.084	-1.60	1.01	0.114	-1.64	1.01	0.105
income	0.30	0.29	0.313	0.28	0.34	0.403	0.32	0.34	0.342
bachelorsdegree	-0.67	0.53	0.211	-0.68	0.48	0.156	-0.72	0.48	0.139
graduatedegree	-0.57	0.52	0.276	-0.56	0.47	0.236	-0.59	0.46	0.209
white	-0.56	0.95	0.552	-0.63	1.05	0.548	-0.64	1.02	0.533
attractivecustomer	-0.21	0.40	0.596	-0.23	0.43	0.587	-0.17	0.41	0.678
R1	-	-	-	0.32	0.64	0.616	0.35	0.64	0.591
R2	-	-	-	0.26	0.79	0.746	0.22	0.79	0.785
R3	-	-	-	0.02	0.66	0.973	0.10	0.66	0.879
R4	-	-	-	0.11	0.55	0.843	0.20	0.55	0.714
weekday	-	-	-	-	-	-	-0.60	0.43	0.160
R^2	0.72	-	-	0.72	-	-	0.72	-	-
F-Statistic	11.48	-	<.001	11.50	-	<.001	11.98	-	<.001
N	204	-	-	204	-	-	204	-	-

Table 9 – Results from Regressions #5a - #5c

	Regression #5a Dep Var = $ tip			Regression #5b Dep Var = $ tip			Regression #5c Dep Var = $ tip		
	Coefficient	SE	P-Value (2-tail)	Coefficient	SE	P-Value (2-tail)	Coefficient	SE	P-Value (2-tail)
constant	-0.66	1.94	0.735	-1.15	2.31	0.618	-1.79	2.41	0.460
billsize	0.15	0.04	<.001	0.15	0.04	<.001	0.16	0.04	<.001
attractivemale	-0.60	0.73	0.411	0.31	0.88	0.730	0.62	0.87	0.481
unattractivemale	-0.62	0.55	0.258	-0.02	0.47	0.963	0.04	0.48	0.941
unattractivefemale	-0.93	0.53	0.087	-1.03	0.57	0.076	-0.80	0.49	0.109
$ tipnorm	0.18	0.26	0.496	0.27	0.31	0.378	0.22	0.28	0.443
tablesize	-0.40	0.25	0.111	-0.66	0.33	0.051	-0.67	0.33	0.048
#checks	1.16	0.87	0.187	1.52	1.05	0.151	1.54	1.03	0.141
age	-0.01	0.02	0.676	-0.02	0.02	0.488	-0.02	0.02	0.385
servicequality	0.41	0.17	0.021	0.43	0.16	0.009	0.42	0.17	0.014
whiteserver	0.43	0.54	0.430	0.04	0.71	0.959	0.02	0.76	0.977
overweightserver	1.37	0.60	0.024	1.47	0.69	0.037	1.67	0.72	0.023
religious	0.55	0.47	0.250	0.95	0.56	0.091	0.91	0.56	0.108
credit/atm card	-0.46	0.39	0.241	-0.74	0.50	0.148	-0.44	0.43	0.312
diningfrequency	0.15	0.11	0.167	0.09	0.14	0.502	0.14	0.16	0.377
serverbackground	-0.25	0.57	0.669	-0.24	0.62	0.704	-0.32	0.58	0.577
dependent-on-parents	0.09	0.87	0.919	-0.07	0.82	0.931	0.13	0.77	0.865
married	0.51	0.69	0.462	0.59	0.62	0.345	0.59	0.61	0.330
income	-0.52	0.58	0.374	-0.50	0.56	0.374	-0.53	0.55	0.338
bachelorsdegree	-0.32	0.43	0.467	-0.32	0.53	0.549	-0.26	0.53	0.624
graduatedegree	0.33	0.88	0.709	0.40	1.05	0.706	0.30	0.97	0.763
white	0.37	0.97	0.702	0.35	1.01	0.727	0.50	0.99	0.620
attractivecustomer	-0.18	0.39	0.641	-0.25	0.40	0.536	-0.20	0.39	0.618
R1	-	-	-	1.33	0.68	0.056	1.34	0.69	0.057
R2	-	-	-	0.86	1.11	0.442	1.14	1.23	0.358
R3	-	-	-	1.01	1.33	0.447	1.15	1.37	0.405
R4	-	-	-	-1.14	0.77	0.142	-0.95	0.81	0.244
weekday	-	-	-	-	-	-	1.12	0.72	0.123
R^2	0.68	-	-	0.70	-	-	0.71	-	-
F-Statistic	19.64	-	<.001	16.91	-	<.001	18.30	-	<.001
N	103	-	-	103	-	-	103	-	-

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APPENDIX A - SURVEY

THIS SHORT SURVEY IS FOR A Ph.D. DISSERTATION. THE INFORMATION YOU PROVIDE IS ANONYMOUS. THANK YOU FOR BOTH YOUR TIME AND COOPERATION.

1. How many people were at your table?_____

2. How many checks did your table have?_____

3. How many people, **including yourself**, did you pay for?_____

4. What was the total bill for the people, **including yourself**, who you paid for (**NOT INCLUDING TIP**)?_____

   Are any of the people you paid for going to give you money toward this amount *(circle your response)*?

   Yes No

5. How much money, **in dollars and cents**, did you tip the server?_____

   Of the people you paid for, did anyone **other than you** leave a tip *(circle your response)*?

   Yes No

6. Was the tip automatically added to your bill? *(circle your response)*

   Yes No

   If you answered yes, what was the percent tip automatically added?_____

7. How did you pay for your bill? *(circle your response)*

   Cash Credit Card ATM Card Check Other:_____

   If you paid by either credit or ATM card, did you leave your tip on the card?*(circle one)* **Yes No**

8. Did anyone whom you paid for, **including yourself**, have:

Appetizers? (includes soups, salads) *(circle your response)*	**Yes No**
Entrees? *(circle your response)*	**Yes No**
Desserts? *(circle your response)*	**Yes No**
Alcohol? *(circle your response)*	**Yes No**

9. On a scale from 1 to 7, how would you rate the service you received from your waiter/waitress? *(circle your response)*

Poor						**Excellent**
1	**2**	**3**	**4**	**5**	**6**	**7**

10. What was your server's sex? (*circle your response)* **Male Female**

    To the best of your knowledge, your server was: *(circle your response)* **White Black Other**

TURN OVER→ TURN OVER→

11. On a scale from 1 to 5, how would you rate your server's attractiveness? *(circle your response)*

Homely	Below Average	Average	Above Average	Strikingly Handsome/Beautiful
1	2	3	4	5

12. On a scale from 1 to 5, how would you rate your server's weight? *(circle your response)*

Severely Underweight	Underweight	Average	Overweight	Severely Overweight
1	2	3	4	5

13. On a scale from 1 to 7, how would you rate the frequency with which you dine at this particular restaurant? *(circle your response)*

Least Frequent						Most Frequent
1	2	3	4	5	6	7

14. Have you ever been employed as a waiter or waitress? *(circle your response)* **Yes** **No**

    Have any of your close friends or family ever been employed as a waiter or waitress? *(circle your response)*

    Yes **No**

15. For tax purposes, are you a dependent of your parents? *(circle your response)* **Yes** **No**

16. What is your sex? *(circle your response)* **Male** **Female**

17. Which of the following categories best describes you? *(check appropriate box)*

    Black/African-American **White/Caucasian** **Asian-American/Oriental** **Middle Eastern**

    Hispanic-Black/Spanish-Speaking Black **Hispanic-White/Spanish-Speaking White**

    Native American/American Indian **Other (Please Specify):_____**

18. What is your age?_____

19. What is your marital status? *(circle your response)*

    Single **Married** **Divorced/Separated** **Widowed**

20. Do you regularly attend religious services? *(circle your response)* **Yes** **No**

21. What was your family's (all of the people in your household) approximate total income last year? *(circle you response)*

    Less Than $18,000 **$18,000 - $33,000** **$33,000 - $52,000** **$52,000 - $82,000**

    More Than $82,000

22. What is the highest level of education that you have completed? *(circle your response)*

    Some High School **Completed High School** **Some College** **Bachelor's Degree**

    Graduate/Professional Degree **Other (Please Specify):_____**

23. On a scale from 1 to 5, how would you rate <u>your attractiveness</u>? *(circle your response)*

Homely	Below Average	Average	Above Average	Strikingly Handsome/Beautiful
1	2	3	4	5

24. What do you think the norm is regarding <u>percent tip</u> in a restaurant? *(do not give a range)*_____

THANK YOU!! PLEASE FOLD AND PLACE IN BOX