Jump To Year:  

CES-WP-10-01

The Closure Effect: Evidence from Workers Compensation Litigation

Henry Hyatt

January 01, 2010

Consideration of the “best interests” of Workers Compensation (WC) claimants often involves the assumption that those who receive benefits in a “lump-sum” behave “too myopically” with respect to labor supply. However, many attorneys argue that lump-sum settlements induce a beneficial “sense of closure.” In this paper, I provide an empirical context for these ideas using a unique set of linked administrative databases owned by the State of California. Upon receipt of a court-approved lump-sum settlement, WC claimants immediately increase labor supply. No such change is found for claimants who receive a court-approved settlement in which the insurer provides benefits over time, suggesting that the method of litigation settlement is a determinant of labor supply.

25 Pages 74433 Bytes

View Paper

CES-WP-09-25R

On Spatial Heterogeneity in Environmental Compliance Costs

Randy Becker

January 01, 2010

This paper examines the extent of variation in regulatory stringency below the state level, using establishment-level data from the U.S. Census Bureau’s Pollution Abatement Costs and Expenditures (PACE) survey to estimate a county-level index of environmental compliance costs (ECC). County-level variation is found to explain 11-18 times more of the variation in ECC than state-level variation alone, and the range of ECC within a state is often large. At least 34% of U.S. counties have ECC that are statistically different from their states’. Results suggest that important spatial variation is lost in state-level studies of environmental regulation.

36 Pages 341254 Bytes

View Paper

CES 10-02

Euler-Equation Estimation for Discrete Choice Models: A Capital Accumulation Application

Russell Cooper, John Haltiwanger, Jonathan Willis

January 01, 2010

This paper studies capital adjustment at the establishment level. Our goal is to characterize capital adjustment costs, which are important for understanding both the dynamics of aggregate investment and the impact of various policies on capital accumulation. Our estimation strategy searches for parameters that minimize ex post errors in an Euler equation. This strategy is quite common in models for which adjustment occurs in each period. Here, we extend that logic to the estimation of parameters of dynamic optimization problems in which non-convexities lead to extended periods of investment inactivity. In doing so, we create a method to take into account censored observations stemming from intermittent investment. This methodology allows us to take the structural model directly to the data, avoiding time-consuming simulation based methods. To study the effectiveness of this methodology, we first undertake several Monte Carlo exercises using data generated by the structural model. We then estimate capital adjustment costs for U.S. manufacturing establishments in two sectors.

33 Pages 233006 Bytes

View Paper

CES-WP-09-44

Employee Capitalism or Corporate Socialism? Broad-Based Employee Stock Ownership

E. Han Kim, Paige Ouimet

December 01, 2009

How employee share ownership plans (ESOPs) affect employee compensation and shareholder value depends on the size. Small ESOPs, defined as those controlling less than 5% of outstanding shares, benefit both workers and shareholders, implying positive productivity gains. However, the effects of large ESOPs on worker compensation and shareholder value are more or less neutral, suggesting little productivity gains. These differential effects appear to be due to two non-value-creating motives specific to large ESOPS: (1) To form management-worker alliances ala Pagano and Volpin (2005), wherein management bribes workers to garner worker support in thwarting hostile takeover threats and (2) To substitute wages with ESOP shares by cash constrained firms. Worker compensation increases when firms under takeover threats adopt large ESOPs, but only if the firm operates in a non-competitive industry. The effects on firm valuation also depend on the strength of product market competition: When the competition is strong (weak), most of the productivity gains accrue to employees (shareholders). Competitive industry also implies greater job mobility within the industry, enabling workers to take a greater portion of productivity gains.

53 Pages 522371 Bytes

View Paper

CES-WP-09-43

The Impact of Plant-Level Resource Reallocations and Technical Progress on U.S. Macroeconomic Growth

Amil Petrin, T. Kirk White, Jerome P. Reiter

December 01, 2009

We build up from the plant level an “aggregate(d) Solow residual" by estimating every U.S. manufacturing plant's contribution to the change in aggregate final demand between 1976 and 1996. We decompose these contributions into plant-level resource reallocations and plant-level technical efficiency changes. We allow for 459 different production technologies, one for each 4- digit SIC code. Our framework uses the Petrin and Levinsohn (2008) definition of aggregate productivity growth, which aggregates plant-level changes to changes in aggregate final demand in the presence of imperfect competition and other distortions and frictions. On average, we find that aggregate reallocation made a larger contribution than aggregate technical efficiency growth. Our estimates of the contribution of reallocation range from 1.7% to 2.1% per year, while our estimates of the average contribution of aggregate technical efficiency growth range from 0:2% to 0:6% per year. In terms of cyclicality, the aggregate technical efficiency component has a standard deviation that is roughly 50% to 100% larger than that of aggregate total reallocation, pointing to an important role for technical efficiency in macroeconomic fluctuations. Aggregate reallocation is negative in only 3 of the 20 years of our sample, suggesting that the movement of inputs to more highly valued activities on average plays a stabilizing role in manufacturing growth.

69 Pages 295360 Bytes

View Paper

<<    <  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  >    >>